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Abstract
There are sometimes good reasons to define a criminal offense in a way that is over-
inclusive, in the sense that the definition will encompass conduct that is not other-
wise wrongful. But are these reasons ever sufficient? When, if ever, can such laws 
justifiably be made and enforced? When, if ever, can they permissibly be violated? 
In The Realm of Criminal Law, Antony Duff tackles this challenge head on.  We 
find Duff’s strategy promising in many ways as an effort to reconcile over-inclusive 
offenses with the wrongness constraint on criminalization. Nonetheless, we aim to 
move the discussion forward by raising questions about Duff’s solution and high-
lighting some limitations and costs. We begin in Part 2 by sketching the contours 
of Duff’s position; then in Part 3 we propose one refinement and offer two practical 
observations; and finally, in Part 4 we raise broader concerns. In particular, we ques-
tion whether the problem of over-inclusive offenses is one that can or ought to be 
solved, or whether it is better conceived as a difficulty to be managed and mitigated. 
Of course, we should avoid undue harshness in the law where we can, and Duff’s 
approach is guided by this worthy ambition. But there may also be a limit to this. 
To the extent that the harshness cannot be avoided, perhaps this should be acknowl-
edged and faced up to, rather than obscured or finessed.
Keywords Criminal law · Culpability · Mala prohibita · Legal moralism
1 Introduction
The law is a blunt instrument. Two guys walk into a bar. The bouncer asks for ID to prove 
they are old enough to drink. One produces his driver’s license to show he’s 35, but the 
other forgot his wallet. The owner is on bouncer duty tonight, and she waives them both 
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in, as they both have scruffy beards and greying hair. However, following several deaths in 
the city of Collegetown caused by underage drinking, it has been made a criminal offense 
to admit any person into an establishment serving alcohol without individually confirm-
ing their age by examining a government-issued ID. There are (let’s say) good reasons for 
the existence of this offense. Still, few would say that what the bar owner did was truly 
wrong, and her conduct is not the sort of thing that the offense really aims to prevent. For 
the law to label the bar owner a criminal and punish her as one is very plausibly unjust.
This classic puzzle about malum prohibitum offenses illustrates a significant chal-
lenge for lawmakers, legal officials, and legal theorists, as well as for citizens who 
must navigate the demands of both law and morality on their conduct. There are 
sometimes good reasons to define a criminal offense in a way that is over-inclusive, 
in the sense that the definition will encompass conduct that is not otherwise wrong-
ful. But are these reasons ever sufficient? When, if ever, can such laws justifiably be 
made and enforced? When, if ever, can they permissibly be violated? In The Realm 
of Criminal Law, Antony Duff tackles this challenge head on.1 He softens the blunt-
ness of this type of law with subtlety and insight, offering a strategy for reconciling 
over-inclusive offenses like the above malum prohibitum crime with the principle 
that wrongness is a prerequisite for legitimate criminalization. Characteristically for 
Duff, his attempt to answer what initially seems to be a narrow theoretical puzzle 
ends up illuminating a wide range of foundational issues about the criminal law.
We find Duff’s strategy promising in many ways as an effort to reconcile over-
inclusive offenses with the wrongness constraint on criminalization. Nonetheless, 
we aim to move the discussion forward by raising questions about Duff’s solution 
and highlighting some limitations and costs. We begin in Part 2 by sketching the 
contours of Duff’s position; then in Part 3 we propose one refinement and offer two 
practical observations; and finally, in Part 4 we raise broader concerns. In particu-
lar, we question whether the problem of over-inclusive offenses is one that can or 
ought to be solved, or whether it is better conceived as a difficulty to be managed 
and mitigated. Of course, we should avoid undue harshness in the law where we can, 
and Duff’s approach is guided by this worthy ambition. But there may also be a limit 
to this. To the extent that the harshness cannot be avoided, perhaps this should be 
acknowledged and faced up to, rather than obscured or finessed.
We do not take our concerns to constitute a refutation of Duff’s view. Instead, our 
aim is to clarify the choice about whether to sign up to Duff’s approach or rather to 
opt for a less theoretically ambitious alternative. As with all of Duff’s work, we find 
that critically engaging with it pays hefty dividends.
2  Duff’s Solution to the Problem of Over‑Inclusive Offenses
We begin by presenting and clarifying Duff’s solution to the problem of over-inclusive 
offenses—namely, how to justify crimes that include act tokens that are not otherwise 
wrongful, that is, not wrongful independently of their criminalization. The danger here 
is the dire one of subjecting morally innocent conduct to criminalization and, ultimately, 
1 Antony Duff, The Realm of Criminal Law (2018).
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punishment. Malum prohibitum offenses are one category of crimes that raise this chal-
lenge: they are assumed to encompass predominantly act types that are not wrongful 
independently of the law. Another closely related category of crimes that raise this chal-
lenge are overly broad “proxy” offenses that are defined to cover an act type that, on 
the one hand, does include some tokens that are mala in se (the target wrongs) but, at 
the same time, also encompasses numerous tokens that are non-wrongful.2 The discus-
sion to follow covers both problematic categories of over-inclusive crimes, though for 
simplicity we often focus on mala prohibita. In the rest of Part 2, we explain Duff’s pre-
ferred version of the wrongfulness constraint on criminalization (section 2.1), then clar-
ify the puzzle to be solved (section 2.2), before sketching Duff’s solution (section 2.3).
2.1  Negative Legal Moralism and the Strong Wrongness Constraint
Duff aims to defend a version of negative legal moralism that is characterized by 
what he calls the Strong Wrongness Constraint (“SWC”). It holds that “we may 
legitimately criminalize a type of conduct only if it is wrongful independently of its 
criminalization.”3 Four clarifications are in order regarding SWC.
The first concerns the sense of wrongfulness that SWC treats as a prerequisite for 
criminalization. For Duff, SWC should be taken to mean that criminalizing act type 
X requires not that X is pre-legally wrong, but that it is wrong independently of the 
criminal law—either prohibited by morality (i.e., mala in se) or prohibited by a justified 
non-criminal regulation. To satisfy SWC, as he puts it, what is required is that the con-
duct “is prohibited by a pre- or non-criminal regulation; what is then criminalized is the 
violation of that regulation, on the grounds that such violations are wrongful…. [T]his 
shows how a criminal law focused on wrongfulness can have room for mala prohibita.”4 
It should be noted, however, that while this move accommodates the existence of some 
mala prohibita, it cannot fully resolve the problem posed by over-inclusive mala pro-
hibita (or other over-inclusive offenses). We return to this point below (in section 2.2).5
2 Id. at 64.
3 Id. at 58.
4 Id. at 21.
5 There are difficult questions about the relationship between wrongness in the sense SWC is concerned 
with and the notion of blameworthiness (or culpability), also thought to be a prerequisite for just crimi-
nalization. We won’t take a stand on this issue here, but note a few possibilities which might inform 
further work. A familiar view is that wrongness concerns the physical conduct that has been prohibited 
(actus reus), while adding mens rea elements to the offense definition is supposed to guarantee the pres-
ence of blameworthiness. On this view, an action can be wrong (i.e., a prohibited actus reus) without also 
being blameworthy. However, this view might be challenged by those who think actions cannot properly 
be morally wrong without also being blameworthy. (For example, as John Stuart Mill claimed in Utilitar-
ianism, Ch. V, “[w]e do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be pun-
ished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opin-
ion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.”) Here, we do not settle this difficult question of whether 
actions can be wrongful in the relevant sense without also being blameworthy. Instead, we set aside the 
question of when and how the one notion might come apart from the other and focus on uncontroversial 
cases of wrongfulness in which blameworthiness is also present. Nothing in our discussion (as in Duff’s) 
should turn on how the relevant notion of wrongfulness is filled in.
 Criminal Law and Philosophy
1 3
Second, and relatedly, SWC is to be contrasted with what Duff calls the Weak 
Wrongness Constraint (“WWC”). This is the claim that “‘[i]t is permissible to crim-
inalize some conduct only if that conduct is wrong either independently of its being 
criminalized or as a result of its being criminalized.’”6 Duff sets aside this weak 
version of the constraint because, as he reasons, ultimately either it imposes no con-
straint on what act types can permissibly be criminalized, or else there is no mean-
ingful difference between WWC and SWC. No constraint at all is imposed on what 
can be criminalized if WWC is read to mean simply that anything that has been 
criminalized becomes, in virtue of that fact, wrongful, and thus permissibly crimi-
nalized. On the other hand, if WWC is understood in a more robust way to recognize 
that specific, additional conditions must be satisfied in order for conduct to become 
wrongful in virtue of its prohibition by law (as is the case with traffic rules or other 
regulations designed to solve coordination problems), then it is not clear how WWC 
differs from how Duff understands SWC. For as we have noted, Duff understands 
SWC to mean that any wrongness that is independent of criminalization is enough 
to satisfy the wrongness constraint, even if this wrongness is itself explained by the 
operation of the law (“[e]nacting a regulation can… make a normative difference…. 
It would therefore be consistent with [SWC] to criminalize breaches of the regu-
lation, so long as they are wrongful qua breaches of a regulation that ought to be 
obeyed”7). Thus, Duff sets aside WWC and focuses just on SWC. We follow him in 
this.
The third clarification is this. Presumably, SWC cannot mean that legitimately 
criminalizing an act type, X, requires that absolutely every token of X is wrongful 
pre-criminally. Theft surely can be legitimately criminalized. But not every instance 
of the act type theft is wrongful. Sometimes acts of theft are justified or excused. 
Thus, as Duff recognizes,8 SWC must be understood to mean that act type X cannot 
be criminalized unless the unjustified and unexcused instances of X would be pre-
criminally wrongful. Accordingly, we suggest the following canonical statement of 
SWC:
SWC (official): The state may legitimately criminalize an act type X only if all 
tokens of X that do not satisfy one of the justifications or excuses that would 
be properly recognized in our criminal law system are pre-criminally wrong 
(i.e., either mala in se or prohibited by a justified non-criminal regulation).
One final clarification: Is SWC an all-things-considered constraint on criminali-
zation or merely a presumptive constraint—that is, a weighty but defeasible reason 
not to criminalize conduct that is not pre-criminally wrongful? Some theorists like 
7 Id. at 60.
8 For instance, he notes that the concern about over-inclusive crimes arises because “there will be peo-
ple who commit the criminal offence, without what the law recognizes as a defence, but who do not act 
wrongfully in doing so.” Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
6 See Duff, supra note 1, at 58 (quoting Victor Tadros, Wrongness and Criminalization, in The Rout-
ledge Companion to Philosophy of Law 157, 158 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012)).
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Andrew Cornford and James Edwards think it must be only presumptive.9 Duff, 
however, is interested in defending SWC as an all-things-considered and “categori-
cal constraint on the criminalization of non-wrongful conduct.”10
2.2  SWC and the Problem of Over‑Inclusive Offenses
With SWC clearly in view, the remaining challenge that Duff confronts is this. If SWC 
is true, how can mala prohibita, or other crimes that are over-inclusive in relation to their 
target wrongs, be justified? In particular, what is the adherent of SWC to say about acts 
that contravene a malum prohibitum or over-inclusive criminal prohibition where the 
actor knows her act will not be harmful or bad (i.e., will not bring about the evil the statute 
seeks to prevent)? SWC would seem not to allow such acts to be justifiably criminalized.
Consider an example of Cornford’s that Duff discusses: statutory rape.11 Sup-
pose it’s a crime in our jurisdiction for an adult over 18 to have sex with someone 
under 16. This offense targets the underlying wrong of exploitative sex, but there 
are good reasons—to do with clarity, determinacy, and giving people notice so they 
can avoid criminal sanctions, among other things—for the legislature to target this 
wrong indirectly via simple age limits and in a potentially over-inclusive way, by 
defining the age of consent using the bright-line cutoff of 16 years old.12 Suppose, 
then, that 18-year-old Jack is in a committed relationship with a very mature 15-year 
old named Jill. Jack and Jill have loving, consensual, non-exploitative sex. Plausibly, 
what Jack did is not morally wrong (and is not otherwise justifiably prohibited by an 
independently existing, non-criminal regulation). How can it nonetheless be justifi-
able to criminalize Jack’s conduct? Doesn’t this violate SWC?13
Duff offers the following pointed summary of the difficulty:
9 See Andrew Cornford, Rethinking the Wrongness Constraint on Criminalisation, 36 L. &  Phil. 615 
(2017); James Edwards, Criminalization Without Punishment, 23 Legal Theory 69 (2017).
10 Duff, supra note 1, at 61; cf. id. at 63.
11 See id. at 64; Cornford, supra note 9, at 639 (section IV.B).
12 Cornford offers a helpful summary of the reasons supporting such overbroad prohibitions in this case: 
“First, age-of-consent crimes might be a more effective deterrent than crimes explicitly targeting exploi-
tation. (…) Second, age-of-consent crimes cause less secondary victimisation through the criminal pro-
cess than would a crime based on exploitation. By putting exploitation in issue in criminal cases, legisla-
tors would oblige courts to examine intimate details of complainants’ lives and behaviour: for example, 
their relative maturity or their conduct towards the defendant. As is well known, putting complainants 
‘on trial’ in this way can seriously harm them. Legislators can avoid this by defining offences in terms 
of a more easily ascertained fact, like age. [Third, while] age-of-consent crimes do authorise undeserved 
sanctions, they at least make those sanctions relatively easy to avoid. Of course, these offences do…
restrict some liberties to engage in non-wrongful sexual conduct[, but for most people, this] will have 
only a modest impact on their liberties.” Cornford, supra note 9, at 640–41.
13 Note that this is meant to be a problem case even granting that either mala in se status or justified 
regulatory prohibition can constitute the kind of pre-criminal wrongness that can satisfy SWC as a con-
dition on criminalization. The Jack and Jill scenario is offered as a case of criminalizing conduct that is 
not pre-criminally wrongful at all—in either sense. The underlying explanation of this mooted by Duff 
(drawing on Cornford) is that the prohibition of statutory rape applies to acts that cannot be justifiably 
prohibited by any regulation (e.g., consensual, loving sex between two very mature teenagers who are 
each in a position to know that the other’s consent is genuine). See Duff, supra note 1, at 66. This seems 
at least plausible, and we will assume it is correct for purposes of this discussion.
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[U]nless we can appeal, as I do not, to some general obligation to obey the 
law[,] there will be people who commit the criminal offence, without what the 
law recognizes as a defence, but who do not act wrongfully in doing so: not 
because the law that defines the crime is badly drafted, or unjustifiably over-
broad or strict; but because although we have good enough reason to formulate 
both the regulation and the criminal law in those over-broad, over-strict terms, 
some citizens will also sometimes have good enough reason to violate the 
regulation and to commit the offence. Their conduct will thus be morally per-
missible, but the law cannot afford to recognize that permissibility by defining 
their conduct as legally permissible (whether by means of a narrower offence 
definition, or by allowing them a formal defence).14
As this passage highlights, Duff declines to solve this quandary by appeal to a 
general obligation to obey the law. Why? Most simply, because Duff does not believe 
in such a general obligation, and indeed offers arguments against recognizing one.15 
But even setting aside these arguments, there are several reasons to follow Duff in 
declining to appeal to such an obligation. First, the existence of a general obligation 
to obey the law is controversial. This makes it risky for those who are committed to 
SWC to place too much weight on it. Second, if overbroad offenses were consistent 
with SWC because of a general obligation to obey the law, there would—contrary to 
initial appearances—be no puzzle of the kind Duff is trying to solve. If there were 
a general obligation to obey any law that is passed, we simply cannot end up with 
a scenario where one breaks the law but this is not wrongful (as such law-breaking 
would violate the general obligation to obey the law). Duff’s project in this context 
is to assume there is a genuine challenge here—as supported by the sense of unease 
provoked by the statutory rape example discussed above, among others—and then to 
try to identify a solution. By contrast, it would not be satisfying to brush aside the 
apparent unease we feel about such malum prohibitum offenses just by insisting on a 
general obligation to obey the law.
Third, and most fundamentally, even if there were a general obligation to obey 
the law, legislators would still face some residue of the question we started with. 
While such a general obligation to obey the law might have the effect of bringing 
over-inclusive offenses into conformity with SWC, we would still face the deeper 
question of whether this a justifiable legislative strategy. Conscientious lawmakers 
might still wonder whether the power of the state ought to be used to make other-
wise innocent conduct wrongful, and to criminalize it, in this way.
2.3  Duff’s Solution: The De Minimis Principle
Duff therefore aims to meet the challenge directly, without appeal to a general obli-
gation to obey the law. One can, he contends,
14 Id.
15 See id. at 227–28.
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agree that there will be cases in which someone breaches a justified regulation 
whose breach the law formally, and justifiably, defines as a criminal offence, 
and for which [the defendant] can claim no legally recognized defence, but 
commits no wrong in doing so; but still insist that we must not criminalize 
conduct that is not wrongful prior to its criminalization.16
How can this be done? The key is to appreciate “that we can be justified in for-
mally criminalizing [] non-wrongful conduct—in defining it as criminal in the 
books” even when we are not “justified in substantively criminalizing it—in crimi-
nalizing it in action.”17 In the case of Jack and Jill, for instance, even though Jack’s 
conduct is formally criminalized under the legal definition of statutory rape in his 
jurisdiction, SWC could still be satisfied if agents like Jack are not in practice actu-
ally subject to criminal conviction.
This can be accomplished, Duff proposes, by including in the criminal code a de 
minimis provision of the kind found in the Model Penal Code:
De Minimis Provision (DMP): The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, hav-
ing regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the 
nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant’s conduct … 
did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by 
the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant 
the condemnation of conviction.18
If the criminal justice system in which Jack finds himself reliably applies this prin-
ciple, even though he would not have a defense to the charge of statutory rape, he 
would nonetheless at the end of the day not actually face conviction. After all, by 
hypothesis, he “did not actually cause or threaten the target harm or evil” of exploit-
ative sex.
According to Duff’s proposal, DMP is not meant to function as an affirmative 
defense. It is not a justification or excuse that mitigates criminal culpability or oth-
erwise exculpates. Instead, DMP is a requirement on the court in the first instance 
(perhaps to be applied sua sponte). It could also inform charging decisions by pros-
ecutors. Why does it matter that DMP not function as a defense, to be raised by the 
defendant? Why not instead propose a defense or defenses that specifically exculpate 
non-wrongful conduct?
16 Id. at 67.
17 Id.
18 Id. (quoting MPC § 2.12).
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The main reason19 is that the same considerations that weigh in favor of over-
inclusive offense definitions—clarity, determinacy, etc.—weigh against treating 
DMP as an affirmative defense. To introduce such a defense would reintroduce the 
same lack of clarity and indeterminacy that were the reasons for drafting the rel-
evant offenses in an over-inclusive way in the first place.20 For instance, a defense 
to statutory rape protecting defendants who engage in sex that is not exploita-
tive or otherwise wrongful would reintroduce the same difficulties that the origi-
nal bright-line age-of-consent rule was designed to avoid—e.g. difficult normative 
questions of what makes a sexual encounter exploitative and when the individual is 
sufficiently psychologically mature to render the encounter non-exploitative.21 Duff 
contends that DMP operates differently, taking the question of the wrongfulness of 
the conduct out of the ordinary elements and defenses on which liability turns. His 
approach would retain the benefits of a bright line rule in the first instance, but also 
leave room for a more nuanced exercise of discretion by the officials of the system 
(whether prosecutors or judges22). As Duff puts it:
What the law (the law in action) says to those whose conduct is affected by 
the regulation is that they should obey the regulation (‘should’ as opposed to 
‘must’); and that if they are found to have broken it, even for what they take 
to be good reasons, they will avoid prosecution, conviction, and punishment 
(substantive criminalization) only if they can persuade the relevant official 
that those reasons were indeed good enough. This, we might hope, will make 
possible a more informal and more productive examination of doubtful cases, 
whilst providing what should still be a reasonably effective disincentive for 
those who are tempted to violate the regulation without good enough reason.23
20 See Duff, supra note 1, at 66.
21 As Cornford explains, “by introducing a ‘no-exploitation’ defence, legislators would be introduc-
ing precisely the kind of indeterminacy that over-inclusion here serves to avoid.” Additionally, “such a 
defence might set back the goals of prevention.” For one thing, “[e]xploitation would always potentially 
be in issue in criminal cases, so complainants could always potentially end up ‘on trial,’” thus increas-
ing the likelihood of ‘secondary victimization’ of those who had been subjected to the primary offense. 
Furthermore, where deterrence is concerned, “the problem here is that, with such a defence in place, 
exploitation becomes a condition of liability for the crime. Hence, fewer people may be deterred from 
conduct that is actually exploitative, when they believe (incorrectly) that it is not exploitative.” Cornford, 
supra note 9, at 642–43.
22 Or perhaps juries, though Duff does not himself consider this possibility. This is unfortunate, as it 
leaves potentially interesting parallels between Duff’s DMP proposal and the controversial doctrine of 
jury nullification unexplored. On these parallels, see also infra notes 26 and 45.
23 Duff, supra note 1, at 69.
19 At first sight, one might also think that to turn DMP into a defense would be a too-cheap response, 
defining away the problem to be solved. After all, if non-wrongful actions admitted of a defense, then 
they would no longer be formally criminalized. Thus, they would not be an instance of the problem Duff 
is trying to solve. Still, this is unconvincing, as surely it would be a good thing to eliminate the category 
of problem cases to be dealt with by DMP. So cheapness is no reason not to treat DMP as a defense. The 
real reasons are the more substantive considerations in the main text.
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Duff thus sees DMP as offering a superior way to remain on the right side of SWC 
while securing much of the benefit of well-justified over-inclusive offense defini-
tions (e.g. bright line rules).
Having presented his solution to the challenge of over-inclusive offenses, Duff 
offers some insightful discussion of whether DMP should be a matter of official dis-
cretion or rather binding on courts or prosecutors.24 He discusses the pros and cons 
of these two options, but we mention this issue only to set it aside. A further ques-
tion Duff addresses is whether the policy embodied in DMP should be made pub-
lic or kept secret.25 His discussion seems sensible to us, highlighting as it does the 
concerns about legitimacy and transparency that would arise if the DMP were kept 
secret. Again, however, we set this issue aside.26 Our focus will be on the success of 
the overall strategy for reconciling over-inclusive offenses with SWC.
To summarize, Duff settles on a legislative structure that, though admittedly com-
plex, adroitly resolves the challenge posed by over-inclusive offenses. This structure 
acknowledges and vindicates the good reasons for having some formally over-inclu-
sive offense definitions, but at the same time ensures that non-wrongful acts that 
fall within these definitions will not substantively be criminalized—that is, the legal 
system “in action” will (at least ideally) not punish these non-wrongful acts, thanks 
to DMP. This resolution reflects Duff’s conclusion that while the good reasons that 
support over-inclusive offenses are not sufficient to justify substantively criminal-
izing non-wrongful conduct, they are sufficient to put people who non-wrongfully 
commit formal offenses at the mercy of courts’ and prosecutors’ determinations as 
to whether their conduct was actually non-wrongful. This allows Duff to vindicate 
existing criminal law systems that include over-inclusive offenses while still adher-
ing to the absolutist view that any substantive criminalization of non-wrongful con-
duct is categorically morally prohibited. The result is a strong case in support of 
the contours of our existing criminal law that also excavates and renders explicit its 
previously hidden moral logic.
Before proceeding, note that Duff himself is admirably upfront about a range of 
possible drawbacks to the solution he defends. His strategy resembles, he says, “a 
familiar criminalization technique” in which the legislature enacts an over-inclusive 
24 See id. at 68–69.
25 As Duff notes, the DMP “must either be publicized, in a version sufficiently clear and precise to ena-
ble those whose conduct is affected by the regulation to work out whether they might face prosecution 
if they break it; or be kept secret, or published only in such general and vague terms as to leave those 
whose conduct is affected without any determinate guidance. In the former case, the situation would then 
not be substantively different from that in which the legislator provides a formal exemption or defence for 
those who know that they can safely break the regulation: if, as we are supposing, there are good reasons 
against providing any such formal exemption or defence, they also constitute good reasons against pub-
lishing such a policy.” Id. at 69.
26 There are, however, interesting parallels to be explored here with the power of jury nullification, 
which has been allowed uneasily to persist under the awkward condition, in most U.S jurisdictions, that 
juries not be informed of its existence. See Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1601, 
1621 (2001); Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of Law and Justice, 
2013 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1117–18 (2013); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 
1972).
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offense and relies on prosecutors to exercise their discretion to avoid prosecuting 
innocent conduct.27 Duff acknowledges that “[s]uch a technique is, of course, far 
from unproblematic.”28 For one thing, it might “encourage legislatures to be sloppy, 
rather than trying to define offences as precisely as possible” in order to capture only 
conduct that is pre-criminally wrongful.29 Second, it might make it more difficult for 
those who are subject to the law to understand what the law requires and foresee the 
legal consequences of their conduct.30 And third, this strategy “accords consider-
able discretion to prosecutors and other enforcement officials: we must ask how their 
exercise of that discretion can be made accountable.”31
These are all dangers or costs associated with Duff’s approach to reconciling 
over-inclusive offenses with SWC (and we will return to them below). However, 
Duff suggests that this tradeoff could, at least sometimes, be worth it. Despite the 
potential drawbacks of DMP, it at least shows how SWC could in principle be satis-
fied even if we also think there are sufficiently good reasons for the criminal law to 
define certain offenses in over-inclusive terms.
3  A Proposed Refinement and Two Observations
We find Duff’s proposal attractive and nuanced. Nevertheless, our task is to identify 
issues, costs, and limitations. We begin in this Part by suggesting a refinement that 
we believe strengthens and clarifies the account, and then offer two observations 
about the scope of what Duff’s proposal achieves, assuming it is successful. In Part 
4 we raise some more searching questions about the limitations of Duff’s approach.
3.1  Proposed Refinement Concerning Formal Versus Substantive Criminalization
Some of the theorists Duff engages with (like Cornford) focus primarily on SWC as 
a constraint on formal criminalization—“the law in the books.”32 By contrast, Duff 
thinks SWC more properly applies only to substantive criminalization—“the law in 
action,” or which conduct is subject to conviction and punishment at the end of the 
day and which isn’t.33 As Duff observes, by relaxing SWC in this way, we can render 
“negative legal moralism more plausible … by seeing criminalization as something 
done not merely by formal legislation, but by the operation of the criminal justice 
system as a whole.”34 In support of this move, Duff contends that SWC, “like any 
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 See Cornford, supra note 9, at 644 n.78 (contending that “the wrongness constraint is unsound as a 
principle of formal criminalization,” though acknowledging that it might stand as a principle of substan-
tive criminalization).
33 Duff, supra note 1, at 68–69.
34 Id. at 68.
27 Duff, supra note 1, at 68.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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principle of criminalization, should guide all the system’s officials; to see whether 
it is respected we must look at the system as a whole—at enforcement as well as 
at legislation.”35 In fact, this point appears to be crucial for Duff’s solution. After 
all, even where DMP is enacted, it will not actually alter the statutory definitions of 
over-inclusive crimes.
In our view, however, this significant relaxation of SWC is both normatively wor-
risome and not obviously necessary for Duff’s theoretical purposes; a more mod-
est and arguably more attractive adjustment would serve his aims just as well. Duff 
makes the plausible claim that SWC, “like any principle of criminalization, should 
guide all the system’s officials.”36 Where legal officials have a choice between a 
law enforcement action that is consistent with SWC and one that is not, it seems 
clear that they should choose the former. For this reason, it may be that to know 
whether SWC is fully respected within a given system “we must look at the system 
as a whole—at enforcement as well as at legislation.”37 But of course this does not 
entail that legislation considered on its own—the “law in the books”—is not also 
separately bound by SWC, irrespective of what the system as a whole is doing. The 
legal system might, instead, be required to comply with SWC at both levels—for-
mally and substantively.
We are open to the idea that SWC should constrain the law in action, but we need 
not take a stand on the matter here. Our basic point is only that SWC should func-
tion as an independent constraint on the content of the criminal law in its own right 
as well. The way in which the law formally defines crimes is itself morally signifi-
cant. By attaching, if only formally, the label of crime to certain acts and of crimi-
nal to those who perform them, the “law in the books” gives authoritative voice to 
important communal values and attaches a powerful stigma. It should only do this 
where the acts encompassed by its definitions are legitimately stigmatized in this 
way. Declining to enforce an over-inclusive criminal offense cannot absolve the for-
mal law of unjustifiably stigmatizing innocent conduct, any more than declining to 
carry out a wrongful threat can absolve the threatener of having wrongfully made 
the threat in the first place—these are half measures, at best.
Accordingly, our view is that, even if SWC applies to the substantive law “in 
action,” it also provides a natural way to evaluate the formal content of the crimi-
nal law (regardless of how it is applied in practice). But we think this point can be 
handled in a way that is hospitable to Duff’s project. In particular, we suggest that, 
rather than attempting to argue that SWC is a constraint only on the criminal law as 
enforced (“the law in action”), it would be better to focus on SWC as a principle that 
at least also independently constrains the set of criminal prohibitions and principles 
contained in the criminal code as a whole. We thus propose that SWC should be 
seen as a constraint on which actions are ultimately legally punishable according 
to the terms of the code, once all applicable provisions are taken into account (and 
independently of the realities of law enforcement).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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This represents something of a compromise position between viewing SWC as 
a constraint on the content of individual offense definitions and Duff’s suggestion 
that SWC should function only or primarily as a constraint on what conduct is actu-
ally prosecuted and punished (i.e., the law in action). We remain neutral on whether 
some additional version of SWC should also operate as a constraint on the actual 
operations of the substantive criminal law. Instead, we maintain there is at least one 
version of SWC that operates on the content of the formal criminal law viewed holis-
tically. The latter is all Duff really needs in order to carry out his project (and so this 
amounts to a friendly amendment, which lessens the commitments he needs to take 
on to achieve his theoretical aims). After all, suppose SWC is taken to apply holisti-
cally to the content of the law, i.e. as a constraint on what ultimately is punishable 
once all applicable liability-determining rules contained in the criminal code are 
taken into account. In that case, we end up with a constraint on the formal criminal 
law that is nonetheless relaxed sufficiently to allow reference to be made to DMP 
when determining whether individual offenses (or indeed entire formal systems of 
criminal law) comply with SWC. The result is that DMP can serve its assigned role 
of bringing what would otherwise be over-inclusive crimes into conformity with 
SWC.
This has the added benefit of locating different kinds of injustice in the right 
place. Even if the “law in action” were to contain no injustice or violations of some 
broad practically focused version of SWC, it would still be a problem—a distinct 
form of injustice—if the criminal code as a whole allowed convictions to be imposed 
on innocent conduct. The latter would be a violation of the formal version of SWC 
as a constraint on the content of the criminal law. There is an intuitive distinction 
between what the law says (its content) and how what it says is applied, and eras-
ing all injustices in how the law is applied would not cure remaining injustices that 
attach to what the law says is punishable. Recognizing that SWC also constrains the 
content of the criminal law (construed holistically) preserves the distinction between 
what the law says and how it is applied.
Now, this does not threaten Duff’s overall attempt to reconcile over-inclusive 
offenses with SWC. We are offering a friendly amendment, after all. But it does 
show that he doesn’t need to retreat all the way to SWC as a constraint on the law in 
action; it is enough for his purposes to agree that SWC is a holistic constraint on the 
content of the criminal law.
3.2  Two Observations About Applying DMP
We now turn to two observations about the scope of what Duff’s proposal would 
achieve from a practical standpoint, assuming it is successful. The last section was 
not meant to suggest that Duff’s concern with application is misplaced as a general 
matter. His attention to the degree of justice displayed in the law in action is laud-
able. But DMP creates new challenges where application of the law is concerned—
in two different ways.
The first concerns the discretion DMP affords legal officials. Duff acknowl-
edges that his proposal “accords considerable discretion to prosecutors and other 
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enforcement officials: we must ask how their exercise of that discretion can be made 
accountable.”38 But to be clear, this is not merely an incidental cost of his proposal; 
it identifies a condition that must be met in order for the proposal to accomplish its 
central aim of demonstrating how a system that contains over-inclusive offenses can 
be rendered compliant with SWC. A legal system that has DMP on the books, but in 
which DMP is not applied appropriately by the relevant officials, might conform to 
SWC formally but yet repeatedly commit serious injustices at the level of its opera-
tions.39 This means that in order fully to resolve the tension between over-inclusive 
offenses and SWC, the legal system must ensure that its officials are both account-
able and, crucially, capable of applying DMP appropriately and consistently.
This is no trivial point, for DMP asks a lot of officials. It effectively requires 
judges (and perhaps other officials)40 to ascertain, with respect to each crime on the 
books, what harm or evil the crime seeks to prevent, what kinds of conduct “actu-
ally” cause or threaten such harm or evil, and what degree of harm or evil is required 
for conviction. Never again could a judge, faced with a defendant protesting her con-
viction on the ground that her conduct was morally innocent, provide an adequate 
answer by saying “I’m sorry, but that is the speed limit and you were traveling well 
in excess of it,” or, “I’m sorry, but you knowingly sold that traffic signal preemption 
transmitter to a nonqualifying user.”41 Any such application of a criminal offense 
definition would need to be backed up by a sufficiently detailed and complete jus-
tificatory theory of the crime in question for the court to be confident, not merely 
that the defendant’s conduct satisfied the terms of the offense definition (often chal-
lenging enough!), but that the defendant’s conduct (i) actually caused or threatened 
(ii) the target harm or evil (iii) to a sufficient degree to warrant the condemnation of 
conviction. Particularly in light of the vast (and ever growing) scope and complexity 
of our criminal codes, this would appear to require judges (and perhaps other offi-
cials) regularly to accomplish formidable feats of reverse legislative engineering and 
normative theorizing.42 There are at least reasonable grounds for skepticism about 
the prospects for officials to perform this task with sufficient accuracy, consistency, 
and accountability to avoid leading the system as a whole into serious conflict with 
SWC.
This problem of implementation is, of course, not merely a puzzle for theorists; it 
represents a concrete practical difficulty that may give pause to legislatures consid-
ering whether to implement Duff’s proposal. In light of this problem, conscientious 
lawmakers might very well conclude, either with respect to particular crimes or 
quite generally, that the only reliable and effective way to ensure that the legal sys-
tem remains compliant with SWC is simply to eschew over-inclusive offense defini-
tions, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of relying on courts and other officials to perform 
38 Id. at 69.
39 For a similar point about the limits of reliance on official discretion see Edwards, supra note 9, at 81.
40 A related burden will also fall on citizens who want to understand the legal implications of their con-
duct, as discussed further infra section 4.2.
41 18 U.S. Code § 39(a)(1).
42 There are of course going to be major conceptual and evidential difficulties in determining what, pre-
cisely, the evils are that a given statute aims to combat.
 Criminal Law and Philosophy
1 3
the unusual and demanding role assigned to them by DMP. In other words, it might 
turn out, once the facts on the ground are taken into account, that Duff’s in-principle 
solution to the problem of over-inclusive crimes is not viable in practice.
None of this will be news to Duff,43 but it is worth spelling out because it indi-
cates the considerable distance that remains between Duff’s proposal and a com-
plete and operational solution to the problem of over-inclusive offenses. (There may, 
moreover, be a bit of a sense here of moving around a bump in the carpet, which we 
will return to in Part 4.)
Our second, related observation is that Duff’s proposal assumes a great deal about 
the structure and culture of the legal system, which means that, even bracketing the 
previous observation, his solution may not be available in a range of systems that do 
not satisfy these assumptions. As the foregoing discussion indicates, DMP can only 
be acceptable in systems that are willing to delegate significant substantive discre-
tion to officials. This assumes, among other things, a highly trained and principled 
professional class of legal officials who are considered competent and trustworthy 
to exercise such discretion. If we are dealing with a more rule-bound system, one 
that aims to define reasonably precise instructions for how to act in every scenario, 
this strategy of using DMP to satisfy SWC will not be a good fit. That is, it will not 
be a feasible legislation strategy in “low discretion” systems.44 Similarly, it may not 
be feasible in systems that depend heavily on, or find value in, the participation of 
lay persons in official roles (such as the system of lay magistrates in England and 
Wales or lay judges in Norway). (It is also interesting here to compare the phenom-
enon of jury nullification, which could be seen as an alternative way of implement-
ing a DMP-like solution, but has always provoked controversy and never been fully 
embraced for this purpose.45) And other legal systems and legal cultures may prize 
clarity, transparency, predictability, or other values in a way that makes the DMP 
solution a poor fit. In any of these cases, again, it might turn out that the only relia-
ble or effective way to ensure meaningful compliance with SWC is simply to eschew 
over-inclusive offense definitions—or, more problematically from the point of view 
of Duff’s approach, it might turn out that violations of SWC simply have to be toler-
ated for the sake of other values or for the good functioning of the system.
43 As Duff acknowledges: “Whether and when this kind of approach—enacting a strict and over-inclu-
sive regulation; criminalizing violations of the regulation without allowing a formal exemption or a 
defence to those who know that they could violate it safely; but leaving it to enforcement officials to 
apply a De Minimis principle to deal with such cases—could be legitimate depends on a range of factors, 
both normative and empirical.” Supra note 1, at 70.
44 As Scott Shapiro observes, “designers of legal systems are also attuned to the degree of trust that they 
believe it is appropriate to accord to various participants. A high degree of distrust, for example, would 
result in strict constraints on the use of power in the system.” Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 Legal 
Theory 387, 422 (2002).
45 As previously noted, supra notes 22 and 26, there are many interesting potential connections to be 
explored between Duff’s proposal and jury nullification, but this is a topic to which we cannot do justice 
here.
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4  Two Challenges
We said at the outset that the tension between over-inclusive offense definitions and 
SWC raises a significant challenge for lawmakers, legal officials and theorists, as 
well as citizens who must navigate the demands on their conduct of both law and 
morality. This challenge, however, does not look the same from all of these per-
spectives, and Duff’s DMP-based solution has a very different significance depend-
ing on whose point of view is adopted. The theorist’s way is made much easier by 
Duff’s proposal, as we are furnished with a tidy theoretical picture in which SWC 
is preserved as a categorical constraint, sparing us from having to answer difficult 
normative questions about how to balance SWC against other values. Similarly, 
the proposal to a significant extent spares lawmakers from having to agonize over 
whether and exactly to what degree each offense definition they enact runs afoul 
of SWC. After all, from lawmakers’ point of view, these concerns are neatly swept 
under the carpet of DMP. But these genuine and important theoretical gains come, 
we believe, in an important sense at the expense of legal officials and (as we will 
see) private citizens. We have already discussed (in section 3.2) the demands that 
Duff’s solution places on legal officials, but there we were considering what difficul-
ties we would face if we were to accept and seek to implement Duff’s proposal. Here 
we wish instead to ask whether we as a self-governing society should be willing to 
accept the proposal in the first place, given the way in which it tends to redistribute 
the difficulties associated with over-inclusive offenses.
The way in which Duff’s proposal shifts rather than resolves some central diffi-
culties can be illustrated by considering its significance in terms of two familiar con-
cepts: separation of powers and vagueness. The following are not meant as knock-
down objections, but we believe in each case that the proposal has weighty costs that 
may be too easily underestimated.
4.1  Separation of Powers
Duff, as we have seen, is alive to worries about giving too much discretion to courts 
and prosecutors—including concerns about how his proposal could produce legisla-
tive “sloppiness,” a loss of legal transparency and predictability, as well as insuf-
ficient accountability.46 To this list we have added (in section 3.2) a concern about 
how well legal officials will be able to perform the unusual and demanding task that 
DMP assigns to them. But the problem we mean to raise now is different from all of 
these.
It is a worry about separation of powers, and whether Duff’s proposal sufficiently 
respects the wisdom in having different branches of government perform different 
tasks. Adopting DMP would amount to the legislature offloading an important part 
of its distinctive task—the part that involves delivering answers to difficult norma-
tive and policy questions through a deliberative democratic process—onto courts 
46 Duff, supra note 1, at 68.
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and prosecutors. It would force courts and prosecutors directly to confront the ques-
tion of what conduct is sufficiently wrong to merit “substantive criminalization.” We 
think there are good reasons for our system not to operate in this way, relating to the 
proper exercise of legal officials’ and lawmakers’ distinctive powers, competences, 
and roles. We consider the role of legal officials first, before turning to lawmakers.
We cannot give an exhaustive defense of separation of powers here. Instead, con-
sider one possible way to draw out an important aspect of this ideal—namely, the 
idea that the legislature is appropriately tasked with answering difficult policy and 
normative questions in virtue of its distinctively open, democratic, and deliberative 
nature. This approach to answering potentially divisive questions is meant to give 
all citizens a voice through public deliberation and exchange of views among their 
elected and accountable representatives. Even if individuals end up disagreeing 
with the conclusion reached by the legislature on a given question, the law’s answer 
retains some measure of legitimacy because of the transparent way in which all citi-
zens were (in theory) able to have input, via their representatives, into the decision-
making process.
By contrast, the same is not true when the courts or law enforcement officials 
answer difficult normative questions for themselves. The reason is that these institu-
tions largely lack the open, democratic, and deliberative structure that the legisla-
ture (at least ideally) exemplifies. Courts, prosecutors, and police are not equipped 
to provide all citizens with a voice in settling normative or policy-related questions. 
When they answer such questions, the answers are not reached by the people’s 
elected representatives via a public process of deliberation.47
Now, it might be thought that the issue here is no more serious than for common 
law judging or statutory interpretation generally. But the separation of powers prob-
lem we mean to point out seems to us different in kind, for at least two reasons.
First, it is one thing to resolve normative questions around the edges in develop-
ing the law—a bit here and a bit there in the piecemeal fashion of common law 
judging; but it is another thing to throw into the courts’ lap the core question of what 
conduct causes or threatens to a sufficient degree the “target harm or evil” that a 
criminal statute seeks to prevent. That is the fundamental question of offense defini-
tion that sets the agenda for the whole of criminal law, and it seems a mark of pro-
gress that this question has generally been taken over from the courts by legislatures. 
In U.S. federal law, for example, the definition of criminal offenses has long since 
ceased to be a matter of common law development.48 One worries that DMP would 
47 US state judges are admittedly in some cases elected by the people, but even here, their mode of deci-
sion-making is legal in nature and not a characteristically public process of deliberation. While politi-
cians are expected to make policy promises on the basis of which they are elected, it would be perverse 
to expect that judges are elected on the basis of how they would decide particular cases. They are ethi-
cally bound not to comment on cases that might come before them. At most, they could legitimately 
campaign on a general theory of interpretation—but even that is pushing it.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (holding that federal courts 
cannot exercise common law jurisdiction in criminal cases; instead, Congress “must first make an act a 
crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense”).
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represent a step backwards in the direction of a common law criminal system, with 
all the due process concerns that entails.49
Second, DMP represents the delegation to officials of a question that is not only 
fundamental in character but unusually broad in scope of application. By its explicit 
terms, DMP is an invitation to exempt any defendant from prosecution or conviction 
of any crime, based on the relevant official’s best understanding of fraught and con-
tested categories like “target harm or evil” and what “warrant[s] the condemnation 
of conviction.” The difficulty is thrown into sharp relief by the hypothetical situa-
tion of a court or prosecutor who in good faith concludes that very little of the con-
duct covered by a particular offense definition—or perhaps even none of it—actually 
causes or threatens what is best understood as the offense’s “target harm or evil.” 
This is a problem that would not be possible even under a full-blooded common law 
system, but DMP leaves this open as a conceptual possibility. What is an official 
in this situation supposed to do? Do we really want to put officials in the position 
of having to wrestle with and resolve such sweeping, open-ended legislative-type 
questions? Doing so seems to exact an unusually steep cost in terms of the values 
promoted by separation of powers.50
Turn the focus now from legal officials to lawmakers. Duff, recall, acknowledges 
that DMP “might encourage legislatures to be sloppy, rather than trying to define 
offences as precisely as possible, so that they capture, as far as is practicable, all 
and only the types of conduct that ‘cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be 
prevented.’”51 But we see another ground for concern here that is distinct from the 
general fear of sloppiness due to over-reliance on prosecutorial discretion. It is a 
concern less about the importance of accuracy in drafting and more about the moral 
complacency DMP may enable among lawmakers.
Suppose the legislature is persuaded by Duff’s proposal to adopt DMP; and 
further suppose that the legislature continues to approach its task conscientiously, 
determined to avoid sloppiness and to define offenses as precisely as possible. Still, 
in order to do its job of offense definition well, the legislature needs to be able reli-
ably and accurately to weigh up the benefits (in terms of clarity, determinacy, etc.) 
of broad offense definitions against the costs—including the difficulty of officials’ 
task in carrying out DMP, the possibility of errors in practice that would result in 
49 Cf. Jeremy Bentham, Truth versus Ashhurst (1823), The  Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. 5, 235 (“It 
is the judges…that make the common law. Do you know how they make it? Just as a man makes laws for 
his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat 
him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you 
and me. They won’t tell a man beforehand what it is he should not do…they lie by till he has done some-
thing which they say he should not have done, and then they hang him for it.”) (https ://www.ucl.ac.uk/
benth am-proje ct/truth -versu s-ashhu rst).
50 In other contexts, others have also suggested that either too much prosecutorial discretion, or com-
mon law judging, would violate separation of powers principles. See, e.g., Warren Baxter, Separation of 
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Common Law Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661 
(1981–1982); The Hon. Gregory K. Scott, Judge-Made Law: Constitutional Duties & Obligations under 
the Separation of Powers, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 511 (1999) (https ://via.libra ry.depau l.edu/law-revie w/vol49 
/iss2/17).
51 Duff, supra note 1, at 68.
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violations of SWC, and the significance and seriousness of those violations for the 
individual citizens on whom they will fall. It seems to us that there is reason to 
doubt whether the legislature can be in a good position to identify and give appro-
priate weight to these costs.
To see this, notice that after the enactment of DMP the legislature’s task is sub-
tly transformed. Offense definitions that would previously have run afoul of SWC 
are now acceptable, in light of the pressure valve provided by DMP. The legisla-
ture is in a position to enact most any overbroad definition secure in the belief that 
any apparent conflict with SWC will be resolved through the operation of DMP as 
implemented through the discretion of courts and other officials. Regardless of how 
carefully it has done its job in crafting offense definitions, the legislature is put in a 
position to feel that it has paid no moral cost, at least with regard to SWC.
Three features of this situation are worthy of note. First, the legislature can—
and indeed, according to the logic of this approach, should—devolve determinations 
about difficult or finely balanced cases to the courts and other officials. This is not 
a matter of sloppiness; the very logic of the DMP proposal is that these sorts of 
questions are not best dealt with at the more general level of offense definition, and 
should instead be addressed on a case-by-case basis by enforcement officials. As a 
result, the direct difficulty of actually engaging with and resolving these issues is 
effectively removed from the legislature’s consideration. It would be a kind of moral 
dumping that can create worrisome externalities.
Second, the reality, of course, is that no bureaucratic system is perfect, and espe-
cially in light of the difficult task that DMP assigns to courts and other officials there 
are bound to be errors in practice. But these errors will by their nature be invisible to 
the legislature (this is in contrast to the breadth of enacted offense definitions, which 
is of course going to be visible to the legislature). This greatly complicates the leg-
islature’s task in assessing the extent to which each offense definition it enacts may 
give rise to violations of SWC.
Third, even if the legislature does its job carefully and conscientiously, it is 
effectively insulated against a wide range of SWC-based complaints. In answer to 
a citizen who protests that she has been convicted under an over-inclusive offense 
definition despite having done nothing wrong, the legislature can respond: “Even if 
your complaint is legitimate, it is not appropriately addressed to us. We are respon-
sible for the formal criminal law, whose compliance with SWC we have ensured. 
Your complaint can only concern the substantive criminal law, and should thus be 
directed to the legal officials who wrongfully enforced the law against you.” This 
kind of immunity to complaint may be desirable to individual elected legislators, but 
it is patently not desirable for a well-functioning polity.
Together, these features tend towards a similar effect, which is to distance the 
legislature from, and hide from its view, many important SWC-related costs—the 
very costs that must be balanced against the benefits of broad offense definitions in 
order for the legislature to do its job of defining offenses accurately and well by the 
lights of SWC. DMP to a significant extent shifts the responsibility for safeguarding 
against violations of SWC from the legislature to legal officials, and it is in the very 
nature of this shift that relevant difficulties will be made less visible, vivid, and sali-
ent to the legislature. Accordingly, we worry that DMP will affirmatively obscure 
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the moral costs of over-inclusive offenses and thereby lead to their proliferation—
not as mere legislative sloppiness (which is surely all too common already) but as a 
mechanism that predictably causes more injustice. The fear, in other words, is that 
DMP may lead to obliviousness and a false sense of moral innocence on the part 
of the legislature, which will predictably cause more of the very moral tragedy that 
DMP is designed to avoid.
This therefore suggests another reason to preserve the familiar division of respon-
sibilities between legislature and law enforcement officials that prevails under tradi-
tional separation of powers: in order to do its job well the legislature needs as much 
as possible to assess, face up to, and take responsibility for the moral tradeoffs and 
dangers that are associated with the legislation it enacts. In sum, then, we worry that 
Duff’s DMP-based solution would both ask legal officials to perform a function for 
which they are ill suited and put the legislature in a position where it cannot effec-
tively take account of the SWC-related costs of broad offense definitions.
To this, Duff might reply by accepting our concern about separation of powers 
and moral complacency by the legislature, but nonetheless insist that the proper 
response is for the legislature to impose greater accountability on the courts for cor-
rectly applying DMP. Perhaps legislative committee oversight of the application of 
DMP might mitigate the separation of powers concern.
However, we are not entirely satisfied by this response. Even if this is a step in the 
right direction, it would face difficult hurdles in implementation. First, how would 
this mechanism of added accountability function? To impose such accountability, 
someone would need to be tasked with deciding when particular applications of 
DMP are correct and when they’re not. This, in turn, will not only further deplete 
already scarce resources, but it will require staking out a position on what the evil 
to be prevented by the relevant criminal law is, and whether the defendant’s conduct 
imposed a sufficiently small risk thereof for him or her to escape liability. However, 
if the legislature had sufficiently clear views on this question—or could obtain them 
through consultation—it could have just taken this into account when drafting the 
relevant offense definition. Thus, it is likely to have to be an appellate court (or some 
other judicially competent body) that will impose such accountability for correct 
implementation of the DMP, and this recreates the separation of powers problem we 
are seeking to resolve. It would still require an answer on these legislative type ques-
tions from within the judiciary, and thereby still create the political cover and moral 
complacency among the legislature that we were concerned about in the first place. 
Thus, we doubt that general accountability mechanisms imposed to ensure the cor-
rect application of DMP are likely to be a sufficient solution. Maybe they could be 
developed further, but we would need to see what they look like to know if they are 
workable and would justify their considerable cost to run.
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4.2  Vagueness
We take it to be uncontroversial that Duff’s DMP-based solution would introduce 
a significant new source of vagueness or uncertainty into the criminal law.52 And 
just as Duff is alive to general concerns about giving too much discretion to courts 
and prosecutors, he is alive to the concern that DMP may “make it harder for those 
who are affected by the law to understand its scope and foresee the consequences of 
their actions so that they can regulate their conduct without breaking the law.”53 He 
would thus no doubt concede that the uncertainty, from the point of view of those 
subject to the law, that DMP introduces will to some extent undermine the benefits 
of adopting overbroad offenses in the first place, namely clarity and determinacy. 
But here again we worry that the depth and extent of the difficulty may be too easily 
underestimated.
The inherent vagueness of DMP is manifest enough. In particular, DMP’s phrases 
“the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense” and “to 
an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction” are highly inde-
terminate, resulting in a significant degree of uncertainty as to what is and is not 
legally permissible conduct. Uncertainty of this kind carries familiar costs: reduced 
deterrence value,54 less certainty and guidance for citizens keen to stay within the 
law, less certainty and security for potential victims,55 and opportunities for bias 
and abuse by prosecutors and other officials. Moreover, the general nature of DMP 
means that it will tend to have these effects for the full range of criminal offenses, 
not just one offense here or there.
These are the kinds of concerns that underlie the “void for vagueness” doctrine 
in U.S. constitutional law. Whether or not a provision like DMP that is directed in 
the first instance at courts (and perhaps other officials) would be subject to challenge 
by individual defendants as void for vagueness, the void for vagueness doctrine pro-
vides a useful framework for evaluating DMP in terms of the impact that it would 
have on individuals’ ability to understand and predict the operations of the criminal 
law. The U.S. Supreme Court in Skilling v. United States put the test as follows: “To 
satisfy due process, ‘a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with suf-
ficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited 
and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment.’”56 If this is the test to be applied to determine whether DMP introduces too 
52 Our use of the terms “vagueness” and “uncertainty” is not technical. We use them in their general and 
ordinary senses to refer to the extent to which those subject to the criminal law may be unable to under-
stand its injunctions and predict how it will be applied. This is also the sense that “vagueness” carries in 
the “void for vagueness” doctrine, discussed below.
53 Duff, supra note 1, at 68 (brackets and quotation marks omitted).
54 Of course, the deterrence problem would be lessened if DMP were kept secret. But Duff rightly 
rejects this “acoustic separation” as undemocratic, as it fails “to show its citizens the respect that is due 
to them as responsible members of the polity.” (69) .
55 Cornford raises a similar concern. See supra note 9 at 643 about vagueness undermining the preven-
tive effect of the criminal law.
56 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
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much vagueness to be acceptable, we think Duff’s proposal may be in trouble.57 As 
he says, DMP effectively puts it to citizens that “if they are found to have broken 
[the law], even for what they take to be good reasons, they will avoid prosecution, 
conviction, and punishment (substantive criminalization) only if they can persuade 
the relevant official that those reasons were indeed good enough.”58 Imagine that 
you were in Jack’s position in the scenario previously described, in a committed 
romantic relationship with a younger teenager like Jill. In light of this standard, how 
confident would you be in your judgment of what the law requires of you?
To these concerns, Duff could seek to reply that the exculpation on non-wrong-
fulness grounds that DMP makes possible still represents a substantial improve-
ment in terms of avoiding violations of SWC. Granted, DMP does sacrifice a bit 
of determinacy, notice, deterrence, and prosecutorial predictability. But, Duff might 
respond, couldn’t this still be the best compromise of all the relevant considerations 
in play, and one that at least opens up a space for “a more informal and more pro-
ductive examination of doubtful cases”?59 This is not an easy question to answer. In 
general, it seems difficult to determine whether the improvement offered by DMP is 
worth it, or whether the setback to determinacy, deterrence, and guidance to citizens 
is too great to bear. But we think there is a crucially important dynamic in place here 
that significantly weakens this line of response.
The dynamic that troubles us is this: The more effective DMP is in bringing 
broad offense definitions into compliance with SWC, and the more it is put to use 
for this purpose, the stronger the concerns about vagueness become. This is because 
the vagueness effects of DMP are directly related to how often it is invoked. In a 
system where DMP is treated as a measure to be used only in extremis to address 
exceptional and unexpected instances of injustice, the vagueness introduced by 
DMP will be minimal. But the more DMP is treated as a measure to be used liber-
ally, as a resource that officials are expected, encouraged, and indeed considered to 
be obligated to apply routinely for the sake of maintaining the moral acceptability of 
the system as a whole, the more substantial the vagueness introduced by DMP will 
be. And Duff’s proposal would appear to create significant incentives (and indeed 
even normative pressure) for legislators and the legal system to move in the direc-
tion of the latter scenario. These inducements include not only avoiding the pangs 
of a guilty conscience but providing the legislature with a convenient way to avoid 
criticism.
We conclude, then, that the vagueness concerns confronting Duff’s proposal are 
both substantial and unusually sticky, in that the more the proposal succeeds in the 
task that it sets for itself, the graver the vagueness concerns become.
57 The quoted passage from Skilling admittedly does not allow exculpatory principles by themselves 
to be challenged on vagueness grounds, but it remains plausible that the conjunction of a substantive 
offense and DMP could in principle be so challenged insofar as they together would operate to obscure 
the line between criminality and non-criminality.
58 Duff, supra note 1, at 69.
59 Id.
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5  Conclusion
We have been concerned to highlight some troubling aspects of Duff’s proposal: the 
way in which it relies on legal officials to perform what is fundamentally a legis-
lative function; its tendency to obscure from the legislature’s view the difficulties 
surrounding the implementation of over-inclusive crimes; and the danger that reli-
ance on DMP would become sufficiently routine to introduce significant vagueness 
problems. At bottom, the worry is that offering DMP as a solution to the problem 
of over-inclusive crimes serves to deliver a neat theoretical picture in which moral 
tradeoffs and frictions are as much as possible sequestered and removed from view 
(at least, the view of theorists and lawmakers). That serves the aesthetics of theory 
building very well (especially if one of the desiderata for a good theory of the crimi-
nal law is that it more or less vindicates our actual laws, which include quite a few 
malum prohibitum crimes). But in designing a criminal code, theoretical aesthetics 
should not be the only guiding principle; instead, it is plausible that we should want 
any moral tradeoffs to stick out and be in a sense as ugly and visible as possible, so 
that they are as salient as they can be to the relevant officials, including lawmak-
ers. After all, we want the legislature to have to reckon with the risks and costs of 
their preferred policies, especially in as morally charged an area as the criminal law. 
Thus, we wonder if Duff’s suggestion that DMP may be seen as a solution to the 
puzzle of over-inclusive offenses actually minimizes the moral difficulties we want 
the legislature to be forced to grapple with.
While we have focused on trying to develop doubts and concerns, we admire 
and have great sympathy for Duff’s subtle and plausible treatment of these issues. 
Indeed, we are open to ultimately concluding—after all the worries and costs (and 
benefits!) are totted up—that Duff’s response to the problem of over-inclusive 
offenses proves to be the best one on offer. However, our main point is that these 
costs must be clearly reckoned with—not only by the theorist but also by the legisla-
ture in its search for a responsibly crafted and just criminal law.
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